



      
Does Aid Help Improve Economic Institutions?
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Aid is expected to promote better living standards by raising investment and growth. But aid may also 
affect institutions directly. In theory, these effects may or may not work in the same direction as those on 
investment. This paper examines the effect of aid on economic institutions and finds that aid has neither a 
positive nor a negative impact on existing measures of economic institutions. These results are found 
using pooled data for non-overlapping five-year periods, confirmed by pooled annual regressions for a 
large panel of countries and by pure cross-section regressions. We explicitly allow for time invariant 
effects that are country specific and find our results to be robust to model specifications, estimation 
methods and different data sets. 
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Institutions are shaped by history. Whatever other factors may affect 
 their form, institutions have inertia and “robustness”. 
      R.D.  Putnam,  (1993),  pg.8 
      How effective is aid in promoting better growth in poor countries? Over the last decade, new 
data and techniques have been used to examine the relationship between aid and growth, the 
urgency of the issue varying presumably with the tightness of aid budgets. Conflicting results 
have been reported in these different studies. Some, notably, Clements et al (2004) and Dalgaard, 
Hansen and Tarp (2004) among recent papers, find a positive or conditional relationship between 
aid and growth. Papers attempting to nuance the relationship between aid and growth such as 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and World Bank (1998) find that aid promotes growth in good policy 
environments. However, Hansen and Tarp (2001), Easterly (2003), Easterly, Levine and 
Roodman (2004) and Roodman (2004) find that these results are not robust to different data sets 
and specifications. Rajan and Subramanian (2005) reviewing the literature find no robust 
relationship between aid and growth. 
In these papers, the main hypothesis is that aid should raise growth by providing funds 
for investment. As Rajan and Subramanian (2005) indicate, even assuming that all aid is invested 
(and using plausible values for both the share of capital in income and the output capital ratio for 
the average developing country), estimations show that a 1% increase in the ratio of aid to GDP 
should at most raise long run growth by 0.16 percent. If half of aid is wasted or consumed this 
coefficient of aid’s impact on growth should be close to 0.1. This is not a large amount. They 
also note that the coefficient on aid should be close to its impact on investment. Barro and Martin 
(2004, Chapter 12) find a coefficient on the investment to GDP growth rate in the order of .03%; 
thus aid should not be expected to have a large impact on growth through this channel. They 
conclude that to justify higher coefficients found in the literature, one would have to assume that 
aid has a substantial impact on total factor productivity growth- for example because it promotes 3 
higher human capital, better institutions or better policies. This paper examines the effect of aid 
on economic institutions and finds no robust evidence of either a positive or negative relationship 
between aid and economic institutions. 
Studies of the relationship between aid and growth find that much of aid does not 
translate one for one into higher public investment and the effect varies tremendously between 
countries (World Bank, 1998). The typical aid dollar finances 29 cents of public investment. 
Even more noteworthy, studies have found that the share of GDP devoted to public capital 
spending does not have a relationship to economic growth. This is because how spending 
translates into public capital depends on the efficiency of government expenditures and the 
relationship between budgeted and realized expenditures. For example, infrastructure services 
have been shown to be important for growth (Serven and Calderon, 2004) but it is harder to show 
that infrastructure expenditures are important (Hulten, 1996 and World Bank, 1998).  
Even if aid does not affect investment and thus growth directly, aid could affect growth 
(indirectly) through its impact on policies or institutions (or even skills/human capital). Some of 
these changes could be productivity enhancing (or reducing) and could add value even if funding 
public capital does not (see World Bank, 1998). For example, donors often attempt to strengthen 
legal systems and property rights. There are countless projects funded that aim to reform the 
judiciary and numerous laws adopted as a result of donor intervention, for example: bankruptcy, 
accounting, disclosure, company, collateral, and land registration laws. It has been argued that 
many countries underwent rapid economic liberalization (or deregulation, which is equivalent to 
a particular form of institutional reform) because of pressures from the donor community. This 
“Washington Consensus”, though geared towards what was believed to be an improvement in 
policies and institutions was often blamed for much of the vicissitudes of Russia and Latin 
America in the 1990s. Explanations for the less than positive results have varied between an 
underestimation of the time needed to implement institutional change or the too rapid pace of 4 
liberalization (and accompanying change in institutions. In the case of the socialist countries this 
might be expected to show up as less regulation).
2   
If aid worsened some institutions but supported public expenditures on investment, the 
net effect on growth could be either positive or negative. Similarly, the impact would be 
ambiguous if it improved some institutions but worsened others. If aid succeeded in raising 
critical skills then the net effect of all three on growth could be nil, positive or negative.  Or the 
impact of aid may vary between the short and long runs.  
Papers examining the impact of aid on certain aspects of institutional development in a 
country have become popular. The potentially negative impact of aid on institutional 
development is discussed in several papers, old and new. Aid can encourage rent seeking and 
corruption, alleviate pressures to reform domestic institutions (such as taxation), keep 
undemocratic or “bad” governments in power by providing them with resources for their cronies, 
and generally weaken accountability. Alesina and Weder (2002) and Knack (2000) find that 
foreign aid inflows lead to increases in corruption as agents vie for aid resources. Brautigam and 
Knack (2004) contend that high levels of aid create moral hazard for donors and recipients, 
exacerbate collective action problems and weaken local pressures for reform and for 
accountability. In addition, the unpredictability and volatility of aid can have perverse effects on 
fiscal policy (Celasun and Walliser, 2005) and donor fragmentation can reduce bureaucratic 
quality as different donors put pressure on staff in government bureaucracies (Knack and 
Rahman, 2004) to satisfy donors’ own needs (for example needs for financial reporting). 
Djankov et al (2005) find that foreign aid has a negative impact on democracy. They explain 
these results by saying foreign aid could lead politicians in power to engage in rent-seeking 
activities in order to appropriate these resources and to exclude other groups from the political 
                                                 
2 It is also believed that changes in formal laws and regulations (economic institutions) did not take into account 
existing informal systems and other initial conditions (such as income and skill levels) and so tended to undermine 
the transactions they were supposed to strengthen.  
 5 
process. Thus political institutions are damaged because they become less representative and less 
democratic. Some work on economic institutions Knack (2000) indicates that even measures of 
economic institutions performed poorly as a result of aid. Svennsson (2000) finds that aid is 
associated with more regulation and that more regulation is associated with more corruption.  
But just as aid can have a negative effect on political institutions and corruption through 
the rent seeking process, it may also have a positive effect on certain economic institutions. 
These effects would be generated because (a) resources are needed to set up institutions and aid 
provides these resources, (b) the skill building, knowledge dissemination (which provides 
relevant information on economic outcomes to stakeholders, including voters and leaders within 
existing political systems)
3, policy advice and conditionality associated with aid aims to improve 
institutions and (c) aid enhances incentives to undertake reforms (not necessarily investment). 
Thus it is equally possible for aid to influence economic institutions positively. Presumably the 
larger the flows of aid to a country, the higher in absolute terms is the flow of these other factors 
to a country so that aid flows serve as proxy for the other dimensions of aid. In reality, there may 
be countries where the two dimensions of aid are substitutes: countries receiving less money may 
receive relatively more effective policy advice (so that countries with higher aid flows may show 
less institutional development because the non-money factor is absent or unimportant or because 
the negative effect of money overrides any positive effect of policy advice)
4. We assume that 
countries receiving higher aid flows also receive more policy advice and conditionality aimed at 
strengthening institutions. Finally, as mentioned earlier, aid could have positive effects on some 
types of institutions but have negative effects on others so that the overall effect may be zero. 
Kilby (2004) finds that donor funds favor more heavily regulated economies and promote 
deregulation. Remner (2004) finds aid to be associated with increased public spending but 
reduced tax effort. Bannerjee and Rondinelli (2003) find that aid does not have a systematic 
                                                 
3 If aid is used to disseminate policy impacts, aid may change leaders’ incentives within political institutions. 
4 In practice we are not able to disentangle these separate effects in our regressions. 6 
influence on the decision to begin privatization, that the impact of aid on privatization is limited 
to technical assistance and that in countries with “better” governance, aid may be more important 
or effective in the privatization process. Tavares (2003) finds that aid reduces corruption. 
Other potential impacts of aid on factors that affect growth are also possible. The aid 
literature has examined the negative effects of real exchange rate appreciation following high aid 
inflows on trade and growth. A recent example of these types of papers is that by Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005) who find that aid inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country’s 
competitiveness, measured as a decline in the share of labor intensive and tradable goods 
industries in the manufacturing sector. In order to understand how aid affects development it is 
important to examine aid’s impact on a broader set of factors.  
 In this paper, we revisit the issue of aid and institutions, focusing particularly on the 
“economic” institutions measures. Historical development and the cross country growth 
literature have both demonstrated that different types of political institutions and conditions have 
supported growth. More specifically, having more or less democracy does not predict growth 
outcomes. But economic institutions matter. (Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2004, 2005)) and they are 
not linked in a one to one predetermined relationship with political institutions. Figures 1-4 show 
the correlation between a measure of democracy from polity4 and alternative measures of 
economic institutions from ICRG and the Fraser Institute. Correlations between different 
measures of economic and political institutions are not large over decades (though they are 






Table 1: Correlations between democracy and measures of economic institutions 
bq corr polity4 bq corr polity4
bq 11
corr 0.8276 1 0.6971 1








avgp olity4 0.5942 0.6002 1
*Notes for Tables 1 and 2:
bq= bureaucratic quality, corr= corruption, from 
ICRG; polity4 (from polity IV index, normalized 




Figure 1: Change in World Institutions: corruption and democracy, 1984-1997 
 
 
Figure 2: Change in World Institutions: bureaucratic quality and democracy, 1984-1997 
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Figure 3: Change in World Institutions: property rights and democracy, 1970-2000 
 
 
Figure 4: Change in World Institutions, regulation and democracy, 1970-2000 
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The main conclusion of this paper is that aid does not have an impact on different measures of 
economic institutions once we explicitly control for country effects that are time invariant and 
are country specific. We conclude that estimations showing that aid either negatively or 
positively affects institutions omit historical determinants of institutions that are important in 
shaping today’s institutions. Once we account for these factors, we find no robust effect of aid on 
institutions. We do both cross section and dynamic panel data (GMM) analysis to ask the 
question whether aid has any effect on a variety of measures of economic institutions. Our results 
are robust to different definitions of aid (for example we distinguish between technical assistance 
and other forms of lending), to a number of specifications and to different datasets. 
  Furthermore, we find that the results in the literature that find a negative relationship 
between aid and democracy (a measure of political institutions) and a positive relation between 
aid and corruption are not robust to specification or estimation methods and vanish once we 
explicitly consider country fixed-effects. These results are not shown here.
5 
Data on Aid and Economic Institutions 
  For the panel regressions in this paper we use indicators of economic institutions from 
two main datasets for the panel regressions-the ICRG and Fraser Institute datasets. As a 
robustness check we also use an indicator to measure institutional development more narrowly. 
This measure is linked to institutional development in the financial sector. We focus on a subset 
of indicators that represent our notion of economic institutions – those that support economic 
transactions but not through the political process. Indicators of democracy, checks and balances 
within government and political stability (or civil wars) fall in the latter category. For the ICRG 
dataset, available for 1984-2002 we use measures of bureaucratic quality and corruption as 
indicators of “economic” institutions (in contrast to government stability, internal conflicts, 
                                                 
5 But are available upon request. 11 
ethnic tensions, democracy and accountability which do not fall in this group). The ICRG data 
are available on an annual basis for 113 countries.
6  
In the annual data we selected five indicators from the ICRG data set, (see details in the 
data appendix table). The variables we considered are bureaucratic quality, corruption, law and 
order, expropriation risk, or repudiation risk.
7 
The other data we use are five yearly data from the Fraser Institute available for the 
period 1970-2000. Two indicators are of interest: freedom from government regulation and legal 
structure/security of property rights. The first variable ranges from 0 (low freedom=high 
regulation) to 10 (high freedom=low regulation). This indicator is an aggregate of 15 sub-indices 
and is called “Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business. This index reflects a mix between what 
is commonly accepted as desirable institutional outcomes and simply, less regulation. For 
example, under most conditions it is desirable that administrative procedures are not an 
important obstacle to setting up a business, that the percentage of deposits held in private banks 
is high (as opposed to deposits in public banks), that businesses are generally free to set their 
own prices and that interest rate controls and regulations do not lead to negative rates.  But the 
indicator also includes a measure of whether hiring and firing practices are determined by private 
contract (as opposed to some government regulations). It is not clear how much regulation would 
be considered “good” in all contexts. For those who would contend that the indicator picks up 
mostly “less regulation”, it would help test the hypothesis that donors successfully promoted the 
Washington Consensus model of “liberalization, privatization and competition”. Alternatively, it 
would be a test of whether donors supported better institutions.  
The second indicator measures aspects of: a) judicial independence, b) impartial courts, 
c) protection of intellectual property rights, d) military interference in rule of law and the 
political process, and e) the integrity of the legal system.  
                                                 
6 Note that other authors, e.g. Knack (2000and 2004) also use the ICRG data.   
7 In the empirical section we do not present all the regressions due to space constraints but these are all available 
upon request. 12 
Finally, we use another measure of institutional quality that is sector specific. It may be 
argued that most of the existing measures of institutional quality are too broad (and subjective) to 
be good indicators of the effects of aid on institutional quality. One way to narrow the analysis is 
to consider institutional quality in a particular sector or a set of institutions geared towards 
promoting a particular transaction- we choose the financial sector. Following Clague et al. 
(1999), we think that measures of financial assets kept in the banking system, namely M2 minus 
currency in circulation, are a good proxy for institutional development in the financial sector. 
The reasoning is that individuals would be very unlikely to hold money in banks if the legal and 
regulatory framework did not sufficiently lower the risk of bank failure or expropriation so as to 
make bank deposits desirable. Donors have put a lot of aid funds and policy advice into financial 
system development, specifically bank privatisation and banking sector regulation and 
supervision.  
Three types of aid flows are used. The first is Effective Development Assistance over real 
GDP (AID), as in Chang et al., 1998. The second is Net Overseas Development Assistance over 
real GDP (ODA) and includes technical assistance, as in Alesina and Weder (2002) and technical 
assistance completed as the difference between ODA-AID. This variable is available for 1975-
1995 from Chang et al (1998). Missing values are extrapolated based on a regression of EDA on 
Net ODA.  The standard measure of aid (Official Development Assistance, ODA) lumps 
concessional loans together with grants if the loan’s grant element exceeds 25%, while Effective 
Development Assistance converts these loans to their grant equivalent and thus provides a better 
measure of long term resource flows.  
 
Model Specification and Estimation Strategy 
Cross-Section Estimation 
In this section, as in Knack (2001), Knack (2004), Brautigam and Knack (2004) and 
Kilby (2005) we consider the effect of aid on economic institutions in a pure cross-section of 13 
countries. Since the main source of variation is given by cross-country differences we are forced 
to omit country effects (fixed effects). The equations we estimate are of the following form: 
0 ii i i i yy X A α δβδ ε Δ=+ + + +         ( 1 )  
Where  i y  represents the change in the quality of economic institutions, and  i y0 is a 
variable representing the initial level of institutional quality. This specification is used since 
initial institutional effectiveness is believed to determine subsequent development (institutions 
are persistent) and to catch a regression toward the mean effect. It is also the specification used 
in a number of recent papers (such as those mentioned above). The variable  i A  represents three 
different types of aid flows: overall development assistance (oda), development assistance net of 
technical assistance (aid) and technical assistance (ta). For the cross country regressions, our 
main specification assesses the effect of aid flows in the specifications shown in (1), though our 
main results remain unchanged if the model is specified in levels or in pure changes, that is, 
without the initial level of institutions.
8 For the panel data, GMM analysis, we focus on a 
dynamic equation in levels, though we also consider the model in changes. In the levels 
equations, we capture the effect of past aid flows on institutions through lagged institutions on 
the right hand side. 
In all but the most basic specifications we control for the initial level of GDP or 
concurrent level of GDP. Real GDP computed as LGDP above, is in 1985 dollars. Other 
conditioning variables used in the robustness checks differ across specifications and are added 
drawing from the theory of what determines institutional quality as well as the empirical 
literature on institutions. These variables are legal origin, to account for past historical/political 
influences on institutions, latitude (to account for geographical factors), settler mortality rates a 
la Acemoglu et al. (2002), ethnic fractionalisation, and trade openness to account for the effect of 
trade and competition on institutions. Following Mulligan and Shleifer (2003) who find that 
                                                 
8 We do not think the regression in levels (with aid flows) or in pseudo-changes (with initial institutions) to be the 
most appropriate specification but have estimated these equations in order to reproduce those in recent papers. 14 
more heavily populated states in the US are more heavily regulated, we believe that population 
has a direct effect on institutions. Institutions being costly to set up, more populated countries 
would tend to be more heavily regulated or have more complex institutions.
9  
We run both ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) regressions to 
instrument for aid. We used two sets of instruments. The first instrument set considers only lags 
of the log of gnp per capita and the log of population. For instance, to insure exogeneity we 
consider lags 7 and 11 (depending on the data used), the first, to instrument for the regressions 
using the ICRG data and the second for those using Fraser data and the CIM indicator. Although 
not reported, we checked for the first stage F-statistics of the excluded instruments (in order to 
see if the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors, (see Stock Wrigth 
and Yogo [2004]). All the first stage regressions report an F-test greater than 10.  
The second instrument set is larger and it is composed of the first instrument set and a 
series of dummies for ex-colonies, and for Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Central America, and 
Egypt, as in Rajan and Subramanian (2005). In all the IV regressions, since we have more 
instruments than endogenous regressors, we can test for the validity of the instruments using the 
Hausman tests. In all the specifications we do not reject the null hypothesis of instrument 
validity. Although ten lags seem long enough, it is clearly possible that countries’ economic/ 
institutional situation of ten years ago could affect the level of economic institutions today. It is 
hard to find truly exogenous variations in aid particularly since donors do not give aid 
randomly.
10 
  Tables 3 and 4, report summary statistics.
                                                 
9 Regressions not presented here are available from the authors upon request. 
10 Given that the specification we consider includes the initial level of institutions, we believe that considering only 
aid as endogenous can lead to severe inconsistency in the estimation of the effect of aid on institutions in the cross 
section estimates. The initial level of institutions is itself correlated with the unobservable country effect and the 




Table 3: Descriptive Statistics – Panel  Table 4: Descriptive Statistics – Cross-Section 
Variable Available N Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Available N Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
reg 5 years 70-94 680 5.44 1.15 2.5 8.8 reg8500 104 0.64 0.95 -0.8 3.6
linireg85 104 5.31 1.15 2.5 7.3
prop " " 648 5.46 1.91 1.1 9.6 prop8500 108 0.79 1.28 -2 4.4
liniprop85 108 5.11 1.8 1.7 8.3
icrge " " 602 4.58 1.96 0 10 bur_qu9095 113 0.27 0.71 -2 2
bur_qu90 113 3.26 1.6 1 6
cim " 110 844 0.77 0.15 0 1 corr9095 113 0.24 1 -3 4
corr90 113 3.38 1.52 0 6
rule_law Annual 90-100 1497 3.33 1.69 0 6 exprisk9095 113 1.98 1.8 -3.6 6
exprisk90 113 6.75 2.18 2 10
bur_qual " " 1497 3.28 1.64 0 6 repud9095 113 1.54 1.64 -2 6.4
repud90 113 6.07 2.34 1.6 10
ethn_tens " " 1497 3.79 1.61 0 6 eth9095 113 0.96 1.24 -1.5 4.8
eth90 113 3.5 1.64 0 6
repud " " 1457 6.29 2.28 1 10 cim8500 117 0.04 0.08 -0.26 0.51
linicim85 118 0.79 0.13 0.34 0.98
exp_risk " " 1457 6.89 2.23 1.5 10 lgnp9095 100 0.1 0.37 -1.48 0.9
laid 88 0.91 2.09 -6.36 4.51
corr " " 1500 3.41 1.55 0 6 lpop84 97 16.25 1.49 12.29 20.76
lgnp84 85 7.38 1.32 4.79 9.65
oda " " 763 1.67 2.54 -0.02 16.29 lpop8500 120 0.26 0.18 -0.05 0.81
lgdp8500 110 0.1 0.32 -0.61 1.08
loda " " 572 -0.19 1.81 -9.67 2.79 lpop75 120 15.6 1.71 11.7 20.52
lgdp75 109 7.76 0.97 5.83 10.58
aid " " 763 0.91 1.77 -3.8 12.67 latitude 176 18.51 24.09 -36.89 63.89
legal_origin 176 2.63 1.81 1 9
laid " " 462 -0.69 1.98 -14.09 2.54 eng_legor 176 0.31 0.46 0 1
french_legor 176 0.38 0.49 0 1
gdpg " " 770 1.81 3.51 -13 32.29 germ_legor 176 0.03 0.18 0 1
scand_legor 176 0.03 0.17 0 1
lgdp " " 773 7.94 1.04 5.83 10.75 social 176 0.17 0.38 0 1
islam 176 0.05 0.22 0 1
popg " " 838 1.84 1.47 -5.86 16.62 centam 121 0.06 0.23 0 1
easia 121 0.07 0.26 0 1
lpop " " 840 15.79 1.7 11.59 20.91 egypt 121 0.01 0.09 0 1
ssa 121 0.22 0.42 0 1
syr " " 663 1.27 1.12 0.01 5.09 logmort0 64 4.65 1.25 2.15 7.99
   16
Estimation Results: 
  Table 5 reports the cross section results for 3 variables from the ICRG data set. The first 
column presents the results of the OLS estimation for the base specification for aid (using the 
first instrument set)
11 with GDP and population. Subsequent columns show the IV estimation 
instrumenting for aid and the third column shows the model with a fuller specification that 
includes most of the above-mentioned variables. The model in pure changes is not shown but the 
results are similar. The regressions in Table 4 show that even the OLS regressions do not 
indicate any significant relationship between aid and institutional measures.  
  Table 6 shows similar estimations for the two indicators from the Fraser data set.  In this 
table, column 4 shows the estimation in pure changes (differencing all variables). Table 6 shows the 
only dependent variables among the several tested that have a consistent relationship with aid-the 
variable from the Fraser data set measuring the extent of regulation. These results indicate that aid is 
quite robustly associated with more regulation. High values of this indicator suggest that the economy 
is over regulated. Aid seems to have consistently raised regulation; an alternative way to interpret this 
result is that aid has not been a force for market liberalisation.
12  Table 7 shows the results for our 
financial sector specific institutional variable or contract intensive money. Table 6 indicates that 
some specifications using this variable show a negative relationship between aid and institutions. 
   The OLS cross section results in Table 5, 6, and 7 indicate that it is possible to get a 
significant relationship between aid flows and institutions. But in all cases except one, these 
results are not robust across alternative specifications. In other words, any positive or negative 
relationship between aid and institutions is not robust to the addition of control variables or to 
using IV techniques, with the exception of the indicator “regulation”.   
                                                 
11 Similar results are obtained using oda and ta. 
12 Or that the “Washington Consensus” view is substantiated.   17
As in Acemoglu et al. (2005) we consider the role of history to be crucial in shaping 
institutions today; this means that we consider the cross-sectional results estimation done in 
previous works to be driven by the omission of country effects that are correlated with the initial 
level of institutions. We observe a large and significant effect of the past level of institutions on 
the change of institutions and on the level itself in all the specifications, estimation techniques, 
and considering different indicators of institutions.    18
Table 5. Regressions with Rule of Law, Bureaucracy, Corruption 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(OLS) (IV Aid) (IV Aid) (OLS) (IV (IV Aid) (OLS) (IV Aid) (IV Aid)
Aid)
aid -0.08 -0.13 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.02
(log) -0.64 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05
initial institution   -.67*** -.72*** -.67*** -.40*** -.36*** -.40*** -.52*** -.51*** -.54***
(in year 1990) -0.086 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
lpopulation -1.12 -3.31 0.61 0.37 -2.7 .15* -0.86 -3.93* -0.44
(‘90~’95) -2.61 -2.68 -2.29 -1.9 -2 -1.85 -1.82 -2.13 -1.72
lgnp .63* .69** 1.11*** .45* 0.38 .54** 0.29 0.3 .63**







3.16*** 3.47*** 3.21*** 1.36*** 1.57*** 1.92*** 1.96*** 2.17***
-0.38 -0.35 -7.43 -0.26 -0.29 -0.35 -0.36 -0.35
# obs 79 62 62 79 62 62 79 62 62
Rule of Law Bureaucracy Corruption





2 0.4 0.81 0.85 0.33 0.48 0.6 0.43 0.52
3) robust standard error is reported in the brackets below the coefficient
4) ***designates significance at .01 level, ** at .05 level, * at .10 level.
0.62
Notes:
1) dependent variable is indicator of institutional quality.
2) instrument 1 for aid (lgnp and lpop in 1984) is used. Instrument 2 not shown but basic story similar.  19
Table 6. Regressions with Regulation and Property Rights  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(OLS) (IV Aid) (IV Aid) Changes (OLS) (IV Aid) (IV Aid) Changes
(IV) (IV)
Aid -.14*** -.22*** -.22*** -.33*** .03* -.09** -.06* 0
(log) -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13
Initial Institution -.47*** -.47*** -.49*** -.60*** -.63*** -.61***
(in year 1985) -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
lpopulation -1.07 -0.76 -0.8 -0.95 -0.99 0.998 -0.85 -0.9
(‘85~’00) -0.72 -0.76 -0.77 -1.11 -1.15 -1.3 -1.3 -1.65
lgnp -.25** -0.39 -.45* -1.11*** .93** 0.7 0.61 0.22







3.85*** 4.09*** 4.06*** 2.19*** 3.49*** 4.12*** 3.52** 1.04***
-0.49 -0.59 -0.58 -0.49 -0.66 -0.72 -0.82 -0.56




3) robust standard error is reported in the brackets below the coefficient




1) Dependent variable is change in the institutional indicator, 1985~2000. For column 4, the variables 
are all specified in changes.






English Legal Origin 
Property Rights
 
   20
 
Table 7. Regressions with CIM and aid 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(pure change,OLS) (pure changes,IV1 Aid) (pure changes,IV2 Aid) (IV1 Aid) (IV2 Aid)
Aid 0.0009 -0.003 -0.002 -.012* -.01*
(log) -0.0037 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
Initial CIM -.29** -.29**
(in year 1985) -0.14 (-1.97)
Population -0.059 -0.06 -0.06 -.07* -.07*
(‘85~’00) -0.043 -0.049 (-1.33) -0.04 -0.04
GDP .039*** .038** .039** .04** .04**
(‘85~’00) -0.013 -2.37 -2.43 -0.017 -0.017
.063*** 0.08 .08*** .35** .34**
-0.019 -0.028 -0.027 -0.14 -0.14





0.27 0.26 0.27 0.36 0.36
Notes:
1) Dependent variable CIM is Contract-Intensive Money, 1985~2000.
2) instrument 1: log population in 1975, log gnp in 1975
instrument 2: log population in 1975, log gnp in 1975, dummy for Central America, East Asia, Europe and Sub-
Saharan Africa
3) robust standard error is reported in the brackets below the coefficient
4) ***designates significance at .01 level, ** at .05 level, * at .10 level.
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Dynamic Panel GMM Estimation 
Cross-section methods are simple and easy to interpret, but have weaknesses. 
Relationships may be artificially created by unobserved heterogeneity that is caused by a number 
of factors such as history, mortality rates, geography, or endowments of resources (country 
effects that are not time varying-in the case of economic institutions). The use of panel data can 
overcome this problem. We can look at relationships over time (so we can add within country 
variation to the across country variation), to see whether increases in aid are followed by 
changes in economic institutions, and to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects. The 
main estimated equation is the following one:   
t i i t i t i t i t X y y , ,
'
1 , , ) 1 ( ε η γ β α + + + + − = Δ −        ( 2 )  
Or alternatively, 
t i i t i t i t i t X y y , ,
'
1 , , ε η γ β α + + + + = −         ( 3 )  
Where y_it represents the level of the different institutional indicators for country (i) at time (t), 
y_it-1 is its own lag.  t, is a time trend attempting to catch a common co-movement between the 
regressors and the dependent variable, in the estimates we consider both a linear trend and a set 
of time dummies but we report results only with time dummies.  i η are the country specific 
effects and  t i, ε  are the i.i.d stochastic disturbances. X_it are the regressors. Among them we 
consider the lagged level of the natural log of aid flows.  
The following section provides details on the variables considered and a discussion of the 
results. In this section we describe the methodological aspects of estimating (dynamic) models 
with panel data. There are several econometrics methods which can be used to estimate 
equations like (2), or equivalently (3) where the number of countries (N) is larger than the 
number of time periods for which data are available (T). Because of the assumptions on the   22
presence of country specific effects i η , and on the error terms, i.i.d. t i, ε ; the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) and the Instrumental Variables estimators
13 of α , and β  in the level equation (2) 
and (3) are biased and inconsistent. This is so because the explanatory variable  1 , − t i y  is by 
definition positively correlated with the error term  t i i , ε η + due to the country fixed effect. This 
correlation does not vanish as the number of countries in the sample gets larger, nor as the 
number of time periods increases. As discussed in Bond et al. (2001) and in Bond (2002), the 
OLS levels estimator of the autoregressive coefficient (which suffers from omitted variable bias) 
is considered that upper bound for the true estimates. The Within Groups estimator eliminates 
these sources of inconsistency by transforming the equations so as to eliminate i η
14.  
t i t i t i t i t X y y , ,
'
1 , , ε γ β α Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ −         ( 4 )  
The original observations are expressed in first differences, as in equation (4), and OLS 
estimates performed. Even if the country effect  i η  is removed by the first difference 
transformation, for panels where the number of time periods is small relative to the number of 
countries the first difference transformation induces a "non-negligible" correlation between the 
transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term. The above correlation 
can be shown to be negative and does not vanish as the number of countries gets larger
15.  
As discussed in Bond et al. (2001) and in Bond (2002), we consider the Within Groups 
estimator of the autoregressive coefficient as a lower bound for our estimates. Because of the 
                                                 
13 We refer to estimation that considers aid as the only endogenous regressor and only instruments for aid (as in 
cross section specifications). 
14 When T=2 the Within Group estimator and the First Difference estimators delivers the same data point estimates. 
If T>2 the two estimators are different. In the estimation we consider Fixed Effect Estimates, see Wooldridge 
(2003). 
15 However, the correlation induced by the transformation vanishes, and the Within Groups estimator is a consistent 
estimator when T is large. 
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opposite nature of the bias of the two above estimators, we would expect better estimators-that is 
the true parameters- to lie between the OLS and the Within Groups estimates, or at least to not be 
significantly higher than the former or significantly lower than the latter.  
Several consistent estimators potentially bounded between the OLS and the Within 
Groups estimators are proposed by the econometrics literature but have not been commonly used 
to disentangle the effect of aid on institutions. We focus here only on two of them namely the 
"Differenced Estimator" proposed and developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newy and Rosen (1988) and 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and the "System Estimator" developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and further developed in Blundell and Bond (1997). The main advantage of considering these 
Generalized Method of Moments estimators is that both GMM estimators allow us to control for 
potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables, country fixed effects and temporary 
measurement error. Aware of the severe bias problems and instrument validity issues in the case 
of a persistent (time-variant) measurement error, we leave the discussion on the performance of 
both the Difference and the System estimators to Hauk et al. (2004). By following Bond et al. 
(2001), in the robustness check of the results we assume that the measurement error is transient 
and there is a permanent additive measurement error that is considered time-invariant and thus 
absorbed in the country effect. To allow for the mentioned problem we repeated the estimates 
using as instruments the lagged levels starting from (t-3) instead of (t-2) and the lagged 
difference starting from (t-2) instead of (t-1).
16  
GMM estimators control for endogeneity by using "internal instruments", that is, 
instruments based on lagged values of the explanatory variables. These methods do not allow us 
to control for full endogeneity but for a weak version of it. More precisely, we assume that the 
explanatory variables are only "weakly exogenous", which means that they can be affected by 
                                                 
16 Results are the same and not reported but available on request.   24
current and past realizations of institutions but must be uncorrelated with future unanticipated 
shocks to institutions (the error term). Thus, the above correlation assumption implies that future 
unpredictable innovations in institutions do not affect current foreign aid. This assumption is 
commonly shared and accepted in the growth literature (the first application is Levine et al. 
(2000), for details see Bond et al. (2005)) and for the first time discussed in the aid and 
institutions literature.  
To consistently estimate equations (2) and (3), where potentially all the regressors, t i X , , 
can be endogenous, and to account for errors in the differenced equation being correlated with 
the lagged dependent variable we need some additional assumptions. First we assume that the 
error term  t i, ε  is i.i.d, and second that the explanatory variables  t i X ,  are weakly exogenous such 
that in the GMM estimation, as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), we can exploit the 
following orthogonality conditions: 
0 )] ( [ 1 , , , = − − − t i t i s t i y E ε ε s 2 ≥  ¸ 2; t = 3; :::::; T            (5) 
0 )] ( [ 1 , , , = − − − t i t i s t i X E ε ε s 2 ≥  ¸ 2; t = 3; :::::; T            (6) 
The GMM estimator based on the above orthogonality conditions is commonly defined as 
the "Differenced Estimator". The two orthogonality conditions only satisfy one of the two 
requirements needed by the GMM estimators. As showed by Alonso-Borrego and Arellano 
(1996) and by Blundell and Bond (1997), when the explanatory variables are persistent over time 
and this is the case when we deal with variables like institutions which have an autoregressive 
coefficient that is always greater than 0.7 - lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments 
for the regression equation in first differences. In these cases severe problems of identification   25
can lead to bias and could result in a poorly performing differenced estimator, see Arellano et al. 
(2002), Wright (2005), Bond et al. (2005). 
17 
To reduce the weak instruments bias
18 of the Difference-Estimator, Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997) propose a different GMM estimator: the System Estimator. 
The System Estimator, using some mild stationarity assumptions, relies on a system of equations, 
namely the regression in differences, (eq. (4)), added to the regression in levels, (eq. (3)). The 
system estimator exploits the orthogonality condition of equations (5) and (6) for the equation in 
differences. For the equation in levels, lagged differences of the corresponding variables are used 
as instruments. Under mean stationary assumptions, these are shown to be appropriate 
instruments; that is the additional conditions required are that there be no correlation between the 
differences of the variables and the country specific effects: 
0 ] ) [( , , = − + + i q t i p t i y y E η ;0 ] ) [( , , = − + + i q t i p t i X X E η           ∀ p,q                (7) 
The additional moment conditions for the second part of the system, the regressions in levels are: 
0 )] )( [( , 1 , , = + − − − − t i i s t i s t i y y E ε η   s = 1,         (8) 
and 
0 )] )( [( , 1 , , = + − − − − t i i s t i s t i X X E ε η  s =   1              ( 9 )  
The extra orthogonality conditions help in gaining identification in the case where the 
dependent variable (institutions) comes from a very persistent series. For instance, in the extreme 
case of a unit root the difference,  ) ( 1 , , − − − − s t i s t i y y would be a pure innovation and so the best 
instrument for an AR (1) process. For all the estimates we present a test for the extra assumptions 
                                                 
17 Monte Carlo experiments show that the weakness of the instruments can increase the small-sample bias of the 
GMM estimates and make inference unreliable, Staiger and Stock (1997), Stock et al. (2002). 
 
18 It is worth noting that the bias properties under weak instruments, in this case the presence of a highly persistent 
series, are well known only for the autoregressive coefficient.    26
required by the System-Estimator. As in Huang and Temple (2005), we compare the model that 
considers the assumptions of eq. (5) and eq. (6), and the model that adds the assumptions of eq. 
(7) and eq. (8).  The test consists in estimating both the unrestricted and the restricted models 
using the two different sets of moments conditions, and comparing their (two-step) 
Sargan/Hansen statistics using an incremental Sargan test of the form: 
2
^ ~
~ )) ( ) ( ( r RU J J n D χ γ γ − =                ( 1 0 )  
Where ) (
~
γ J  is the minimized GMM criterion for the restricted model, and  ) (
^
γ J  for the 
unrestricted model, n is the number of observations and r is the number of restrictions. Bond et 
al. (2001), and Bond and Windmeijer (2005) discuss the statistical properties of these tests. 
To test the validity of our preferred specifications we will consider two sets of commonly 
adopted tests. The first is a Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and the second is 
the Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test. The latter examines the hypothesis that the error term 
t i, ε is not serially correlated in the equation in levels. We choose the model’s lag structure and 
the instrumentation strategy by looking at the best combination of results from these tests. To 
avoid model "over fitting" that is, having more instruments than countries- throughout the paper 
our reduced instrument set uses no lags longer than (t-4). As discussed in Bowsher (2002), using 
fewer moment conditions improves the power of the Sargan/Hausman test.  
Estimation Results 
This section presents the results of our panel data analysis in which we estimate 
regressions in the form of equation (3). We consider a dynamic specification for institutions and 
two different information sets. The first one, the basic information set, considers GDP and the 
lag of institutions as the only control variables to explain the level of institutions. The second 
one, the full information set, considers different control variables depending on data availability.   27
For instance variables representing human capital are not available on annual basis and thus are 
not included in the full information set in the annual regressions.  
The main findings can be summarized as follows. Increases in the flow of aid are not 
followed by improvements or declines in the quality of economic institutions. For the whole 
sample, and sub samples used in the robustness check, such as considering Sub-Saharan 
countries only, or East Asian countries, this result is robust across different estimation methods, 
and to variation in the choice of moment conditions. Not surprisingly the annual data results are 
less precise due to the instrumentation strategy but in all the cases we do not reject the restriction 
of b1+b2=0 representing a 2 year effect of the flow of aid on institutions (see Table 8). 
19 
For all the specifications we consider OLS, and Within Groups (WG) estimates, and two 
versions of the “Differenced” GMM estimator. All models include a full set of time dummies. 
The first version of the Dif-GMM (1) is the one-step version of the GMM estimator with White-
Huber heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, while the Dif-GMM (2) is the two step version 
of the GMM estimator. The Dif-GMM (2) estimator always uses the small sample correction for 
standard errors of the two step GMM estimates, (see Windmeijer (2005)). We also consider a 
two-step version of the System estimator, with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation and Windmeijer (2005) corrected. For all the different GMM estimators, for the 
sake of consistency of the results, we consider the same set of instruments following the 
selection rules discussed in the previous section. 
Table 9 reports the first set of results on the legal structure/property rights variable from 
the Fraser Institute. As the table shows, there are reasons to believe that this model and the 
selection of the instrument is properly specified and that the first lag of the dependent variable is 
                                                 
19 Though the coefficients are individually significant and of opposite sign during the first and second years, for the 
annual data we believe that this reflects noise in the annual data rather than a systematic effect of aid on institutions 
that changes sign over the years. In any case, the 2 year effect is zero.   28
sufficient to account for the persistency of institutions. All the specification tests in both the 
System and the Difference estimators pass the desired thresholds. Moreover, the incremental 
Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis; the extra moment conditions are valid. It is worth 
noting that the autoregressive parameters estimated by both Dif-GMM and the Sys-GMM are 
both positive and statistically significant and do lie in the interval defined by the OLS and the 
WG estimates. This confirms the validity of our instruments and it also hints that, for this 
specification, the instruments are not weak. Looking at all the tables together, we note that, 
across all the estimation methods, there is strong evidence that an increase in (the flow) of aid 
does not affect the level of institutions.   29
Table 8: Aid and Institutions: Basic Specification, Annual Data, GMM 
Dep. Var:   Corruption Bur. Qual. Repudiation Rule of Law Exp Risk
0.893** 0.876** 0.908** 0.906*** 0.92**
(0.041) (0.043) (0.038) (0.037) (0.034)
0.024 0.016 0.097* 0.084** 0.125**
(0.032) (0.037) (0.050) (0.036) (0.051)
-0.04 0.047** -0.041 -0.059** -0.074*
(0.030) (0.018) (0.045) (0.026) (0.043)
0.03 0.097** 0.224** 0.117** 0.055
(0.041) (0.038) (0.071) (0.042) (0.045)
Unit Root
[0.010] [0.004] [0.018] [0.012] [0.021]
Long Run Effects (1) -0.153 0.524 0.61 0.265 0.636
[0.616] [0.153] [0.154] [0.398] [0.207]
Long Run Effects (2)
[0.585] [0.143] [0.171] [0.400] [0.146]
Sargan/Hansen Test [0.213] [0.646] [0.765] [0.316] [0.258]
m(1) [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
m(2) [0.034] [0.241] [0.153] [0.015] [0.163]
No. Observations 877 877 877 877 877
Notes: 
Reported here are the results using two step system GMM estimation. Robust standard error are
 reported in "()"
The dependent variables are the annual level of Expatriation Risk,Bureaucratic Quality, Repudiation, Epropriation 
Risk, Corruption (ICRG). Robust standard error are reported in () parenthesis.
The value reported for the GMM estimations are computed considering a reduced instrument set. We use
lags t-2 up to t-3 of the dependent variable and lag t-2 only of Aid, and the log(gnppc) in both the difference
and the system estimations, while the first lag differences of Institutions, Aid and the log of gnppc are  
added (under the mean stationarity assumption) in the system estimation. 
Long Run Effects (1): is the test (b1+b2)/(1-a)=0 and Long Run Effects(2): is the test  (b1+b2)=0.
Long Run Effects (1) is a non linear test of restrictions where the standard errors are computed using the
delta method, while Long Run Effects (2) is just a test for the numerator and is a linear test of restrictions. 
Estimated coefficient and robust standard errors for the time dummies are omitted but available on request.
The values reported for the Sargan/Hansen test are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity
The values reported for m(1) m(2) are the p-values for the Arellan-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) disturbances
in the first differences equations. Under H0: it is tested if the residuals are not first (second) order 
serially correlated."[ ]" report the p-values of the tests. 
 Data are for 12 years, between 1984-1995, as used in Alesina et al. (2002).
t i I ,
1 , − t i I
) ln( 2 , − t i AID
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) ln( 1 , − t i AID
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Table 9: Aid and Institutions: Legal Structure, Basic Specification, five-year Data. 
 
Dep. Var:   W.G OLS levels Dif-GMM(2) SYS-GMM
0.173** 0.598** 0.258** 0.318**
(0.059) (0.041) (0.075) (0.074)
0.182 0.093** 0.163 0.016
(0.095) (0.041) (0.245) (0.111)
0.505 0.454** -0.206 0.532**
(0.359) (0.083) (0.850) (0.246)
Unit Root
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.805] [0.009]
Sargan/Hansen Test - - [0.157] [0.104]
Incremental Sargan - - - [0.190]
m(1) - - [0.003] [0.001]
m(2) - - [0.236] [0.241]
No. Observations 331 331 237 331
Notes:
The dependent variable is the five year level of Legal Structure  (FRG). "W.G" is 
the Within Groups estimation. "Dif-GMM(2)" is the two step step difference 
GMM estimation.
 "SYS-GMM" is the two step system GMM estimation. Robust standard error 
while not robust for the Within Groups estimator. More precisely, in columns   
(v) and (vi) are computed Windmeijer's corrected standard errors,   
while Huber-White sandwich corrected estimates in column (iv).  
 Column (iii) reports Praise-Winsten AR(1) regressions corrected, 
and for heteroskedasticity a la' White.
The value reported for the GMM estimations are computed considering a 
reduced instrument set. We use lags t-2 up to t-4 for all the estimators 
and for all the instruments. Estimated coefficient and robust standard errors for 
 the time dummies are omitted but available on request.  
The values reported for the Sargan/Hansen test are the p-values fot the null
 hypothesis of instrument validity.
The value reported for the Incrental Sargan test is the p-value for the joint 
tests the extra moments used for the system estimator. Under Ho: we test the 
validity of the extra moments.
The values reported for m(1) m(2) are the p-values for the Arellan-Bond test 
for AR(1) and AR(2) disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Under H0: it is tested if the residuals are not first (second) order serially correlated.
 "[ ]" report the p-values of the tests. Data are for 5 years, between 1970-2000.
** Significant at 5 %, * Significant at 10% 
t i I ,
1 , − t i I
) ln( 1 , − t i AID
) ln( 1 , − t i GDPPPC
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Table 10: Aid and Institutions (GMM system):  Basic Specification, five-year Data 







Sargan/Hansen Test [0.104] [0.434] [0.860]
Incremental Sargan [0.190] [0.784] [0.875]
m(1) [0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
m(2) [0.241] [0.694] [0.642]
No. Observations 331 332 438
Notes:
The dependent variable is the five year level of Property, Regulation and CIM,
respectively. "SYS-GMM" is the two step system GMM estimation. Robust standard,
error are reported in "()" which is computed Windmeijer's corrected standard errors.
The value reported for the GMM estimations are computed considering a reduced 
instrument set. We use lags t-2 up to t-4 for all the estimators and for al the instru-
ments.
Estimated coefficient and robust standard errors for the time dummies are omitted 
but available on request. The values reported for the Sargan/Hansen test are the 
p-values fot the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The value reported for the 
Incremental Sargan Test are the p-values to test the moments  used for the system 
estimator. Under Ho: we test the validity of the extra moments.
The values reported for m(1) m(2) are the p-values for the Arellan-Bond test for 
AR(1) and AR(2) disturbances in the first differences equations. Under H0: it is 
tested if the residuals are not first (second) oreder serially correlated."[ ]" report  
 the p-values of the tests. Data are for 5 years, between 1970-2000.
** Significant at 5 %, * Significant at 10% 
t i I ,
1 , − t i I
) 1 , ln( − t i AID
) 1 , ln( − t i GDPPPC  32
 
Only in the pooled OLS estimation is there an effect of aid and it is positive. Previous 
work based on pure cross-section data, the Kilby (2004) panel data and the Djankov et al. (2005) 
estimations also find the OLS estimators to be significant.  The effects of economic development 
on economic institutions are positive and statistically significant at 5%. This result confirms that 
countries’ legal structure is affected by the level of economic development.  In all the 
specifications we observe that the autoregressive coefficient of institutions is positive and 
statistically significant. Given the discussion of the previous section we interpret only the 
estimates of the Differenced and the System estimator. Institutions are persistent and the 
probability of having higher level of institutions today is monotonically increasing in the level of 
past year’s value of institutions.    
Table 10 reports the summary of the System Estimation for our legal structure/property 
rights variable, regulation and contract intensive money. As expected the estimated coefficients 
for the lagged dependent variable are always positive and statistically significant at 5%. The 
coefficient on the level of (the natural log) GDP per capita is positive and significant for legal 
structure and contract intensive money at 5% while it is not for Regulation. Although, we have 
considered a very parsimonious specification given the few theoretical models and possible 
explanations for the evolution of economic institutions, all the tests for specification and 
instruments validity suggest that the selected model is well specified. For instance, for all three 
indicators the Sargan/Hansen tests do not reject the null of instrument validity and the Arellano-
Bond test for autocorrelation rejects the null of first order serial correlation for the AR(1) type, 
but not for the AR(2) type. All the incremental Sargan tests suggest that the extra assumptions 
used in the “System-GMM” estimation are valid. Finally, the unit root tests suggest that although 
institutions are very persistent they do not have a unit root.      33
All the estimation details for regulation and contract intensive money are not reported but 
available on request. For both indicators we followed the same rules to select the best 
specification and the number of instruments as discussed for legal structure.  Table 8 reports the 
estimation results for the five ICRG indicators. We report the “System” estimates only though 
others are available on request
20. The table reports tests for the presence of a unit root and for 
long run effects (or rather the effect over two years). For all the specification and for all the 
indicators we find no evidence of a joint effect of aid. In contrast to Alesina and Weder (2002), 
once we consider the “System” estimator we sometimes find that both the first and the second 
lag of aid are statistically significant but with opposite sign (except for bureaucratic quality 
which is positively associated with more aid). We also considered the specification with 
contemporaneous aid and the first lag of aid and observe the same change in signs). In contrast to 
previous results, we also test the joint (2 year) effect of aid on economic institutions we confirm 
the zero effect as in the five year data.  
Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of aid on institutions, specifically institutions that affect 
economic transactions between private agents or private agents and the state. It excludes 
institutions that regulate political relationships between the state and citizens. Thus our focus is 
not on institutions of democracy or those that determine political stability or voice and 
accountability (though these may affect economic outcomes).  In the very long run, one may 
argue that the nature of economic and political institutions is linked. In the shorter run, as the 
paper discusses, we do not see convergence. A priori, there is no reason why there should be a 1-
1 relationship between the precise design of political institutions and the effectiveness of 
                                                 
20 For the annual data we follow the same procedures to select the model and to assess that the estimates are indeed 
bounded between the within group estimator (fixed effect) and the pooled OLS.   34
economic institutions (which also vary in design). Moreover, a continuous process of what might 
be termed “shocks” for want of a better word, such as changes in external trade, natural events,  
technology, or health, may provide windows of opportunity for changing certain institutions (for 
example economic institutions) before they have an impact on other types of institutions.  
So we ask to what extent aid can affect economic institutions. This is an important 
question since donors attempt to raise growth in recipient countries not just by providing capital 
for investment but by advising on policies and institutions designed to raise the productivity of 
investment. We find no empirical evidence to suggest that aid has a robust and significant impact 
on institutional quality using several measures of institutions. The only exception to this was 
aid’s impact on regulation as defined by one indicator from the Fraser Institute (aid is seen to 
favor more regulation). 
These results suggest that in general aid cannot be said to have affected institutional 
quality. One caveat is that the data could be refined much further. For example, the influence of 
aid targeted to a particular sector could be assessed with measures of institutional quality in that 
sector. For this, more work on clearing up the aid data is needed and better estimates of 
institutional quality would help. We tried to assess the impact of aid in a particular sector, the 
financial sector, but found no effect.  35
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Data Appendix: 
 
Variable Code Data  source  Note
Initial GDP per capita  LGDP  Summers and Heston, 1991, 
updated using GDPG 
Natural logarithm of GDP/capita for first year of 




Contract Intesive Money, M2=M1+quasimoney=34+35
IFC data, 2005 Currency comes from line 14a of International 
Financial Statistics, “currency outside deposit 
money banks.” M2 is defined by IFS as the sum 
of money and quasi-money, or the sum of lines 
14a (currency outside banks), 24 (demand 
deposits), 15 (time deposits
Sub-Saharan Af-rica  SSA  World Bank, 2003  Codes nations in the south-ern Sahara as sub-
Saharan 
East Asia  EASIA  Dummy for China, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand, 
following Burnside and Dollar 
Effective Devel-opment Assis-
tance/ real GDP 
AID  Chang et al., 1998; DAC, 2002; 
IMF, 2003; World Bank, 2003; 
Summer and Heston, 1991 
Available values for 1975–95 from Chang et al. 
Miss-ing values extrapolated based on 
regression of EDA on Net ODA. Con-verted to 
1985 dollars with World Import Unit Value 
index from IMF, series 75. GDP computed like 
LGDP above 
Like AID exception using ODA from DAC 
Real GDP expressed in PPP
Population  LPOP  World Bank, 2003  Natural logarithm 
Mean years of secondary 
schooling among those over 25 
SYR  Barro and Lee, 2000 
DAC, 2002; IMF, 2003; World 
Bank, 2003; Summer and Heston, 
Institutional quality 3 CIM
Net Overseas De-velopment 
Assistance/real GDP 
ODA 
Institutional quality 1 Prop, Reg Disaggregate indicators, available on the web.
Institutional quality 2 ICRG PRS Group’s IRIS III data set (see 
Knack and Keefer, 1995) 
Revised version of variable. Computed as the av-
erage of the three compo-nents still reported 
   40
Tables and Figures:  
Table A1: Correlations between economic and political indices, 1970 and 2000 
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Table A2: Correlations between economic and political indicators, Average 1970-2000 
 













  przdem 1
fhpolrig 1
Notes: Table A1 and A2
Sources: prop rights index (from Fraser, see appendix), regulation (Fraser).
Polity4 (see above)
Fhpolrig: gmented Freedom House political rights index (w/Bollen data) 
(normalized 0-1)  
 
 